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This essay studies the manipulation of food aid to South Sudan, and its interplay with US politics: the US 
is the major donor of relief aid to Sudan, and at the same time it appears as one of Khartoum’s major 
opponents on the international scene. This essay argues that humanitarian aid, and especially food aid, is 
not a substitute for political action, but that it has become the main channel of the US’s Sudan policy for 
the past ten years.  
Torn between its conflicting economic, political, geo-strategic, and moral imperatives, the US has had to 
adopt a difficult strategy: supporting the rebels, but not openly, and not enough to enable them to win the 
war. In this situation, humanitarian aid, with its reputation of neutrality and its moral appeal concealing a 
fundamental vulnerability to all sorts of manipulation, is a very efficient tool. Food aid is especially 
useful: it directly counteracts Khartoum’s strategy (starving the South into submission) and directly helps 
the rebel movement and army in a number of ways (bringing them resources, as well as domestic and 
international legitimacy). Food aid also has the crucial advantage of fitting perfectly into western 
prejudices about Africa – a starving continent dependent on the West – so that no one thinks about 
questioning the underlying motives of US relief aid to Sudan. 
Introduction 
Amartya Sen, “There is no such think as an apolitical food problem.”[2] 
Sudan can boast some world records: largest African country, second longest civil war currently going on 
in the world (nineteen years), highest death toll of any conflict (two million deaths so far, more than the 
sum of Bosnia, Kosovo, Chechnya, Somalia, and Algeria combined), largest number of internally 
displaced persons (more than five million),[3] largest international relief operation ever launched in world 
history (some say the largest failure in humanitarian aid history), and arguably the worst violations of 
human rights.  
Sudan is often presented as one of these “forgotten emergencies” that have proliferated since the end of 
the cold war. Yet, the amount of emergency aid given to Sudan –sometimes more than one million dollars 
a day – invites us to question this affirmation. From a humanitarian point of view, Sudan is far from 
being forgotten. Does the label “forgotten emergency” really reflect the political attitude towards Sudan? 
Such a large-scale and long-term humanitarian intervention could then be seen as one of the many 
examples of governments’ tendency to send relief aid as a substitute for political action in situations of 
messy civil conflicts. To judge from the example of the “sole superpower” on today’s international scene, 
the United States (US), it cannot be said that no attention at all is being paid to the Sudanese case. The 
US is the major donor of emergency aid in Sudan, and it seems to be one of Khartoum’s major 
opponents. The superposition of the two characteristics raises a question: why is the US so involved in 
providing humanitarian aid to a country it apparently fights so fiercely in the diplomatic arena? This leads 
to several related questions: what exactly does US foreign policy towards Sudan consist of? Is US-funded 
humanitarian aid to Sudan a form of political disengagement or a form of political engagement? In other 
words, is US engagement in emergency relief purely based on humanitarian grounds or is it part of a 
coherent policy towards Sudan?  
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This article shows what an important role humanitarian aid, and especially food aid, has played in US 
foreign policy towards Sudan since the early 1990s. It argues that humanitarian aid is one of the main 
channels of the US’s Sudan policy. To successive US governments, funding relief aid is not a “fig leaf” 
for political action but a real tool in the pursuance of the US’s perceived best, but conflicting, interests: 
containment of the Khartoum government, pursuit of the civil war within Sudan, strong support of the 
rebels, but one which is not too open, and not enough to enable them to win. To prove this point, this 
article focuses on the manipulation of humanitarian food aid in South Sudan.[4] It does not analyze the 
issue of humanitarian aid in North Sudan, which is part of a different set of dynamics, with different 
players animated by very distinct motivations. The focus on food aid is grounded on the observation that 
Sudan is constructed as a nutritional crisis: the problem of food is central in the presentation of the 
Sudanese disaster in the media, in most academic studies, as well as in action reports from the different 
international actors involved in South Sudan. Consequently, most relief aid to Sudan takes the form of 
food supply.[5] Part of the puzzle will also be to assess why and how the problem of food has been given 
such a central place in South Sudan.  
This article first details how the conflicting interests of the United States lead it to adopt a difficult 
strategy: supporting the rebels, but not openly, and not enough to enable them to win the war. It then 
shows why humanitarian aid, especially thanks to its core value of “neutrality,” is paradoxically a 
particularly useful tool in such a case. It builds upon this to demonstrate how, in South Sudan, the US 
manages to help the rebels through the humanitarian channel, and why almost no humanitarian or 
diplomatic actor protests against this strategy. To support the demonstration, this article draws mainly on 
academic books and articles, on the "gray literature" from diverse intergovernmental and non-
governmental organizations and from donors, on press reports, and on interviews with aid workers. 
US diplomacy towards Sudan: supporting or not supporting the rebels? 
Like all influential Western and African powers, at first view, the US seems to be totally puzzled by the 
conflict in Sudan. As the American Ambassador for religious freedom Robert Seiple summarized for the 
US Committee on Foreign Relations in 2000:  
“Sudan is both simple and terribly complicated. If it were easy, however, it would not have 
gone on for seventeen years with the killing of two millions plus people, most of them 
noncombatants. It also has been, unfortunately, a war without heroes in the south, certainly 
in the north. So it has been difficult sometimes to take sides and to know that the issues are 
going to be resolved. (…) It is as complicated and as humbling as it gets.”[6] 
Yet, scholars and politicians observing the US policy towards Sudan propose a quite different analysis. 
For example, a congresswoman opposing the US’s Sudan policy points out that “it is as if we really don’t 
want the warring to end and that we are deliberately unwilling to fashion a policy that really will produce 
the stated desired results.”[7] More strongly, an article from Tufts University’s Fenstein International 
Famine Center concludes that “the US, whether it wants to be or not, isa key player in facilitating peace, 
but instead appears to be fomenting war.”[8]         
On the international scene, the US openly adopts a very strong position against Khartoum 
At first sight, there seems to be a strong will in American political circles to overthrow Sudan’s Islamic 
government. US policy on Sudan has been characterized since the early 1990s by a very strong 
international campaign to ostracize the Sudanese government.[9] Diplomatically, the US’s main actions 
were to categorize Sudan as a “rogue state” in 1993, to prompt a realignment of forces against Sudan in 
the Horn of Africa in 1995, and to prevent Sudan’s election as a temporary member of the United Nations 
(UN) Security Council in 2000. Militarily, the US launched Tomahawk missiles at a Sudanese 
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pharmaceutical factory suspected of manufacturing chemical weapons for Osama Bin Laden in 1998. 
Economically, the US supported the 1996 UN economic sanctions against Sudan, and imposed its own 
bilateral economic sanctions in November 1997, blocking all Sudanese assets in the US, restricting 
exports and imports, barring financial transactions, and prohibiting investment in Sudan by companies 
listed on the US Stock Exchange.  
Like many other Western countries, the US fears Khartoum’s will to export Islamic rule into other 
countries, and accuses it of regional destabilization. The US is also adamantly opposed to Khartoum on 
the issue of terrorism, all the more since Khartoum’s links with Bin Laden are supposed to have persisted 
long after Bin Laden’s expulsion to Afghanistan. During political debates, the strongest pressure against 
Khartoum comes from human rights and religious groups. Among these, two networks seem especially 
influential: aid agencies and anti-slavery groups operating in South Sudan, and the religious lobby that 
allies Catholics and Protestants in their protest against the “religious war” waged by Khartoum against 
the South. The religious lobby seems to have become even more influential under George Bush Junior’s 
administration. In 2001, right-wing senators and Christians allied over the issue of slavery in South Sudan 
and started to turn Sudan in a cause comparable to South Africa during the time of apartheid. The 
evangelical lobby was especially influential.[10] After much work, it finally obtained the nomination of 
John Danfort, ex senator and minister of the Episcopalian Church, as special envoy to Sudan, on 
September 6, 2001. At that time, i.e. five days before the terrorist attack on the Twin Towers, observers 
were also expecting a tightening of sanctions against Khartoum, probably on oil or arms. 
As relations with the Sudanese government deteriorated in the early 1990s, the relations between the US 
and the Southern People Liberation Movement (SPLM) improved. Fragile in the early 1990s because of 
the poor human rights record of the SPLM military branch, the Southern People Liberation Army 
(SPLA),[11] the US-SPLM relations improved following the opening of humanitarian space in rebel 
areas and the effort of the rebel movement to at least appear to respect human rights.[12] In 1997, the 
relations were even so good as to prompt the then secretary of state Madeleine Albright to officially meet 
the SPLM leader John Garang in Kampala, and to express support for his objectives. A second official 
meeting between Madeleine Albright and the SPLM and National Democratic Alliance leaders took place 
in 1999 and, according to the press, this time Madeleine Albright promised help to the rebels. In parallel, 
from 1993 on, repeated demands were issued in Congress to overlook the issue of Khartoum’s 
sovereignty and to provide direct assistance to the opposition forces in southern Sudan – “opposition 
forces” meaning the major rebel movement, the SPLM.[13] Representatives linked with the religious 
lobby were usually the strongest advocates of the idea, but hearings and debates show that a large 
majority of American politicians favored the idea. This has resulted in two important pieces of 
legislation. First, the Brownback amendment to the Fiscal year 2000 Foreign Operations, Export 
Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act authorizes the administration to provide food aid 
directly to the SPLA. Second, the Sudan Peace Act introduced in the Senate in January 2001 and still 
under discussion also aims at countering Khartoum by providing direct non-lethal aid to the rebels until 
the Sudanese government accepts a peace agreement. Yet neither the Clinton nor the Bush administration 
has used the legal power it had to directly aid the rebels. At first sight, it is difficult to understand why. It 
seems actually to be due to the pressure of important lobby groups: economic, strategic and diplomatic 
interests restrain the US in its opposition to Khartoum. 
Economic, strategic and diplomatic interests restrain the US in its opposition to Khartoum  
Influential economic groups lobby the US against most of its actions opposing Khartoum. First, Sudan is 
the primary and by far the most important world producer of gum Arabic, a product indispensable to the 
fabrication of candies, soft drinks such as Coca-cola, and pharmaceuticals. Second, several of the oil 
companies involved in oil exploration or exploitation in South Sudan rank among the most important 
firms of the oil industry,[14] and their influence on US policy towards Sudan seems crucial. No US 
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company is directly involved in Sudan, but US citizens are at the head of many companies doing business 
there – Talisman Oil for example. In addition, several American states seem to have an economic stake in 
oil exploitation in Sudan.[15] Finally, a congress representative even evoked the fact that “many of the 
players in [the US] government, including in the Bush administration, have business interests and 
businesses that are doing business” in Sudan.[16] As a result, it seems that the US economic sanctions are 
designed to pretend countering the government of Sudan but without really hurting it, and they are often 
denounced as ineffective. The gum Arabic lobby has obtained an exception to economic sanctions for the 
import of gum Arabic – the only produce that the US was importing from Sudan, and Sudan’s major 
export. As far as oil is concerned, an Office of Foreign Assets Control study shows that the measures 
taken are not strong enough to prevent US companies from working in the Sudanese oil industry, and that 
firms doing business in Sudan can perfectly well raise money on the US capital market.[17] In spite of 
many requests by religious and human rights lobby groups to tighten the sanctions and render them more 
effective, nothing is done.  
Besides, most probably under the influence of these the oil and gum Arabic lobby groups, the US has 
begun softening its position on the issue of terrorism in Sudan. In summer 2000, a team of FBI and CIA 
agents arrived in Khartoum to work on terrorist issues in cooperation with the Government of Sudan. The 
first result came just few months later, in February 2001, with the (discreet) expulsion of the authors of 
the assassination attempt on president Mubarak. This beginning of cooperation became a close 
collaboration after the terrorist attack on the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001. From this day 
on, the Khartoum government has come to serve as a principal collaborator to the US in its attempt to 
understand the functioning of international terrorist networks. Khartoum gives names of terrorists and of 
organizations backing terrorist associations, arrests suspects upon Washington’s request, helps 
Washington map out terrorist networks, etc.[18] As a result, on September 27, 2001, the US abandoned 
its veto on the lifting of UN sanctions against Khartoum, and the multilateral sanctions were finally 
revoked. Probably to appease the human rights and religious groups infuriated by this gesture, the US 
kept its bilateral sanctions (it renewed them for one more year in November 2001), but nevertheless 
backed away from a more effective piece of legislation banning companies doing business in Sudan from 
the US stock exchange. Thus, if the 2001 shift of US policy towards Sudan seemed prompted by the 
aftermath of the September 11 attack, it actually reflects the logical conclusion of a process that started 
more than a year before. The return of terrorism as a first priority for the Bush administration was the 
occasion to reward Khartoum’s new position on terrorism without losing too much credibility in the eyes 
of the US human rights and religious lobby groups. 
US policy on Sudan is thus determined by contradictory influences: human rights versus economic 
interests, and divided political, geo-strategic, and security interests. To further complicate the issue, the 
US cannot take the risk of helping the rebels seize power in Khartoum. First, the SPLM’s human rights 
record is so poor that putting it in power would expose the US to many moral criticisms. Second, no 
influential party in US politics has any interest in seeing the rebels in power. Oil companies currently 
engaged in the oil business in Sudan would encounter huge difficulties due to the probable renewed 
insecurity around the oil fields, and to the risk of their assets being confiscated. Egypt would have 
difficulties in exploiting Nile waters,[19] and Egyptian interests have to be preserved at all costs so that 
Egypt’s cooperation in the Middle East peace process can be secured. As a result, keeping the current 
state of war going seems the easiest way to balance all these different interests: the rebels do not seize 
control of the whole country, hence no one is faced with any problem of secession, accountability for 
human rights abuses, or economic backlash; and on the other hand Khartoum is kept off-balance, and 
cannot concentrate too much on propagating terrorism or fundamentalism.  
Consequently, the best strategy for the US is to find a way to support the rebels enough to enable them to 
counter the government of Sudan, but not enough to help them win, and not too openly in order to 
preserve US economic and strategic interests. Supporting the rebels is especially important now that, with 
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the renewed exploitation of oil fields and the resulting upgrading of Khartoum armaments,[20] the 
Government of Sudan is in the best position ever to defeat its opponents. Humanitarian aid seems the best 
tool for this strategy. 
Humanitarian Aid: between neutrality and politicization 
Using the provision of humanitarian aid to sustain a conflict seems paradoxical at first sight. 
Humanitarian aid is traditionally presented as neutral, apolitical. Besides, aid agencies usually claim their 
independence, refuting all connection to any government, any influence by state parties. How can 
humanitarian aid then be used as a political tool, especially as a tool for reaching political goals 
diametrically opposed to the humanitarian ones? 
The core conception of neutrality of humanitarian aid in Sudan 
Humanitarian aid is usually presented as neutral in its essence. The core conception at the heart of 
international aid agencies’ action is that “the provision of humanitarian assistance should be made on the 
basis of need alone and should be above and beyond any political, military, strategic or sectarian 
agenda.”[21] The International Committee of the Red Cross was the first to develop this principle, and at 
their instigation all international UN agencies and almost all humanitarian non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) adopted it as the basis of their international engagement.   
At the beginning, the main conception was that remaining purely “technical,” for example giving medical 
and nutritional emergency relief aid to civilians, and not paying attention to any political issue, was the 
best way to be neutral. The turning point was December 1994, when about a dozen NGOs pulled out of 
refugee camps in eastern Zaire to protest against the manipulation of their work by Hutu leaders.[22] Aid 
agencies and scholars had realized how badly warring parties could manipulate emergency aid.[23] The 
late 1990s, however, saw an upsurge of criticism against aid agencies, first in academic circles and later 
in the mainstream media. Aid was accused of fueling conflicts, harboring and feeding killers, and feeding 
the war economy. This prompted many aid agencies to reconsider their conception of neutrality. One 
trend was to accentuate the quest for independence, and to claim to be impartial rather than neutral. The 
other – the one often adopted for pragmatic reasons - was to work on all sides of the conflict. In any case, 
the conception of emergency relief as a non-political commitment remains pervasive in humanitarian and 
diplomatic circles.  
The humanitarian intervention in Sudan is constructed as neutral  
In 1989, the UN-led relief operation in Sudan, Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS), was constructed as 
perfectly neutral. The main purpose of this “purely humanitarian operation” was to negotiate with all the 
warring parties the establishment of safe areas in which humanitarian organizations could distribute food 
to all the war-affected populations – on the government’s as well as on the rebels’ side of the conflict.[24] 
Since then, OLS has served as the umbrella for United Nations Agencies and for more than forty local 
and international NGOs respecting the “neutrality principle.”[25] Yet, it should be noted that OLS not 
only came into being just one month after the major shift in US policy towards Sudan, but it also began 
under the impetus of the American Congress.[26] 
OLS was presented at its inception as a “model”, a “major diplomatic breakthrough.”[27] It was the first 
time a government agreed on a violation of its own national sovereignty by accepting that humanitarian 
organizations aid rebel-held areas. Further, the negotiators decided that non-government areas would be 
supplied from Lokichoggio, Kenya, consequently establishing the first legitimate cross-border operation 
for the delivery of humanitarian assistance.[28] Finally, the 1996 OLS Review proudly emphasizes that 
“it was the first humanitarian program that sought to assist internally displaced and war affected civilians 
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during an ongoing conflict within a sovereign country, as opposed to refugees beyond its borders.” 
Informal and ad hoc at the beginning, OLS’s agreements with the warring parties became progressively 
more and more formal and bureaucratic.[29] 
“Neutrality” was a fundamental part of the 1989 agreement which gave birth to OLS and has been 
reasserted in each official document since then. It was the only possibility for UN humanitarian agencies 
to work in rebel-held areas in South Sudan. Still today, UN officials managing OLS argue that 
membership of the consortium automatically confers neutrality on the participants. However, the problem 
is that OLS’s conception of neutrality is twofold. It cannot mean “provision of aid on the basis of needs 
alone” since the OLS agreement states that for any of its actions OLS has to go through the government 
of Sudan and through the rebel factions. Thus, openly, “neutrality” means that OLS ensures that 
humanitarian aid does not influence the direction of the war or confer benefits to one side.[30] It can also 
be interpreted as the fact that both sides can control OLS action. It can thus be argued that the idea of 
neutrality renders OLS vulnerable to all sorts of manipulations. 
Such “neutral” humanitarian interventions are very useful in the political game 
Humanitarian interventions can indeed be used as substitutes, and even as forms, of political intervention. 
First, after the cold war, many scholars[31] have pointed to a growing tendency to use relief aid as a 
substitute for political engagement, especially in cases of messy situations in which no one has a real 
economic or strategic interest in imposing peace. As Alex de Waal puts it, “sending relief is a weapon of 
first resort: popular at home, usually unobjectionable abroad, and an excuse for not looking more deeply 
into underlying political problems.”[32] David Rieff has best analyzed the reasons for this[33]: in today’s 
world deprived of ideals, humanitarian workers can appear as “the last of the just”, and humanitarianism 
as the last moral cause to which people from all religions and all political backgrounds could adhere. The 
heroism involved in many of its actions grab the attention of the media and the approval of the public. Its 
apparent success makes it even more appealing. It thus provides governments with the perfect excuse 
they need to turn their back on world problems they do not want to (or cannot) deal with. Sending aid 
salves western consciences; it is an alibi to at least appear to do something without having to address the 
root causes of the problems.  
Second, thanks to these very reasons, more and more academic scholars and aid workers recognize that 
aid can be a very useful tool for reaching specific political goals. As Duffield argues,[34] the movement 
of privatization of the public sphere that has developed since the end of the cold war has involved the 
passage from a political focus on bilateral aid to a focus on private aid through NGOs. The financial 
resources devoted to bilateral aid have fallen while the financial resources devoted to private aid have 
skyrocketed. This apparent switch, however, should not camouflage the fact that private aid is conceived 
exactly as bilateral aid was regarded earlier: as a constituent part of a State’s foreign policy. There is 
“coherence” among all State actions on the international scene: “in relation to conflict, the different tools 
of aid and politics, trade and diplomacy, and so on, should work together in the interests of stability and 
development.”[35] Aid has no special and independent status. It participates like other constituents in 
promoting the State’s political goals; it is even the “primary form of international policy” towards 
“borderland” countries – i.e. countries that do not present a real strategic or economic interest.[36] It is a 
very useful form, since its appearance of “neutrality” and its positive image disarm all accusations of 
“imperialist” interference and all diplomatic protestations over what would otherwise be seen as 
inexcusable intervention in the internal affairs of another country. 
This is perfectly relevant for Sudan. Bradbury, Leader and Mackintosh recall that, in the early 1990s, the 
international community was still trying to find a solution to the conflict, and OLS was linked to the 
peace process. When the peace process faltered, and especially with the failure of the Inter-Governmental 
Authority for Development (IGAD) initiative, political diplomacy was replaced by humanitarian 
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diplomacy, with OLS as the “focus” and the “medium” for international engagement in Sudan. Most of 
the time, this funding was not disbursed on purely humanitarian grounds: as characterised by the manager 
of a non-governmental organization (NGO), “donors” are actually “governments that donate money,” but 
have themselves called “donors” to mask their political status and better use humanitarian access to fulfill 
their political agenda.[37] This is considered especially easy when working through NGOs “who, 
generally, provide donors with a more flexible policy instrument” than UN agencies.[38] Since the 
beginning of the international humanitarian operation, the US has been the major donor to OLS: its 
overall contribution between 1989 and March 2001 amounted to $1.2 billion dollars,[39] and represented 
some 68% of OLS’s $180 million annual budget between 1989 and 1998.[40] On average, 75% of the 
funding is channeled through NGOs and 25% through UN agencies.[41] This is an easy way to fulfill a 
political agenda aimed at sustaining one of the parties in a conflict: aid agencies are indeed always at risk 
of being manipulated by warring parties.  
AId as a weapon: manipulation of aid by warring parties 
Manipulation of aid in South Sudan is obvious  
Today, deploring the manipulation of aid in conflict situations has become a cliché. Academic scholars, 
politicians, and journalists keep on denouncing this problem in South Sudan; for example, “Operation 
Lifeline Sudan is constantly manipulated by both sides” serves as the introduction to the House of 
Representatives 2001 hearing on America’s Sudan Policy.[42] This problem is logical: as Mary Anderson 
argues,  
“Aid resources represent economic wealth and political power, so people engaged in war will 
always want to control them. It would be odd – even subversive to their cause – if they did 
not do so. […] When the ‘enemy’  receives any support, including humanitarian aid, it is 
viewed as counter to the sought-after victory.”[43] 
South Sudan is a perfect example of the process of integrating relief assistance into the dynamic of 
violence that Alex de Waal details in Famine Crimes. The general pattern he describes seems to have 
been followed step by step: “the diversion or taxation of relief supplies [has] become a major way for 
belligerents to provision themselves and, in time, the very command structure and military strategy 
themselves [have] come to reflect the availability of external aid and the means whereby it is 
delivered.”[44] In South Sudan, aid saves plenty of lives, no doubt, but as it is also manipulated by all the 
warring parties and by foreign governments, it is transformed as a lethal weapon in the war: it increases 
the resources to perpetuate conflict.[45] 
The crucial importance of aid to warring parties: aid increases the resources to perpetuate conflict 
Fighting a war is hugely expensive, so the resources available to the warring parties usually determine the 
pattern and the outcome of the conflict. As Paul Collier has analyzed[46], availability of resources is a 
crucial factor in the initiation and the sustaining of a rebellion. While government can extract taxes and 
direct the State’s resources towards their war effort, rebel armies have to find other ways to generate 
revenues – especially when they do not permanently control a sufficiently large territory and population. 
In Sudan, rebels cannot tap natural resources as other rebel movements do in Angola or Sierra Leone (the 
SPLM has no access to the oil fields yet).  They cannot rely on the financial support of the diaspora, 
which is mostly extremely poor. Their only resource is to rely on foreign aid. Knowing that, the US 
strategy is to counter Khartoum’s manipulation of humanitarian access and to ensure that the rebels have 
access to as much aid as possible. 
In Sudan, diversion and taxation of aid items are the most widely recognized process by which aid 
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increases resources to perpetuate conflict.  
Diversion and taxation of relief supply is blatant in South Sudan. The government always used it, and it 
became particularly important to the SPLM after the end of Soviet and Ethiopian support following the 
collapse of their communist governments. In the 1980s and the early 1990s, diversion was so wide scale 
that NGOs and the UN had to look for a way to stop, or at least minimize it. The 1995 agreement called 
the “Ground Rules” thus comprises an article especially aimed at combating diversion of food aid.[47] 
There is no real enforcement mechanism, however, and diversion has continued almost unhindered in 
government-held as in rebel-held areas. For example, during the 1998 famine crisis in Bahr el-Ghazal, 
OLS dropped huge amounts of food aid, sufficient to prevent all civilians from starving, but the famine 
still continued. After the crisis, the UN, in collaboration with the “humanitarian branch” of the SPLM, the 
Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Association (SRRA), launched a comprehensive internal review to 
investigate the reasons of this failure. It found that much of the food had been diverted to rebel military 
commanders, clan leaders and local tribal chiefs.[48] The 1999 Danish International Development 
Agency [DANIDA] evaluation team even reported that, during the peak of the 1998 famine in Bahr El 
Ghazal, “in one town, WFP [the UN agency World Food Program] was accidentally given a report 
documenting the collection of cereals by the SRRA, 80% of which was allocated to the army, 15% to 
administration, and 5 % to the SRRA.”[49] Diversion does not always happen in such large proportions, 
but testimonies of aid workers, reports, and press articles suggest that it is a permanent characteristic of 
the war in South Sudan, in every place, at all times.[50] 
Food relief items can be diverted from the intended beneficiaries by force, though taxation, or via eligible 
family members. The use of force was especially used in the 1980s, and is still very prevalent among 
small military groups. In some places, humanitarian agencies’ distributions of food to civilian populations 
lead so often to raids by soldiers that certain villages have even asked to be crossed from the list of 
beneficiaries.[51] For the mainstream rebel movements and for the government, “taxation” has become 
the preferred way of diverting food aid. The main reason is that the idea of “taxation” is well accepted by 
the international food providers. Aid agencies and donors usually admit that, like any government, local 
authorities have to raise taxes in exchange for the services they provide to the population (security for 
example). The SPLA, among others, has always asserted its right to raise the tayeen – i.e. to tax civilians 
in the areas it controls.[52] The problem is that usually the “tax” is not reciprocated with any services, the 
“tax” is often applied by force, and the rate of the “tax” is not based on the capacity of the population to 
pay but on the whims of the civil or military chiefs.[53] Finally, the last of the popular ways of diverting 
food aid is via eligible family members. This is particularly easy for the rebels because, most of the time, 
their “humanitarian branches” are entrusted with organizing the distribution of food items brought by 
OLS-sponsored operations.[54] This delegation of the control of food distribution obviously leads to a 
high level of inequality. For example, in SPLM areas, certain children receive triple rations (usually those 
belonging to families associated with SPLM’s officials), while others do not receive any.[55] Many 
analysts[56] even claim that the SRRA was created not to help the population but to channel food to the 
military and political command. 
The most important factor enabling this diversion, and ensuring its continuity, is that rebels and 
government forbid all independent evaluation of need or monitoring of food distribution in areas under 
their control. During needs evaluations, the SRRA and the government of Sudan decide to which sites aid 
workers will have access, so humanitarian agencies cannot obtain a comprehensive picture of the area 
they cover. For the areas they cannot access, humanitarian workers have to work with demographic data 
given by local authorities, with all the bias this implies. In accessible areas, the information gathered is 
often most selective, due to the lack of free interaction with the local population.[57] The program is then 
applied almost blindly, and there is no mean to correct it a posteriori, for future programs: aid agencies 
cannot monitor the impact of the food deliveries. Khartoum and the SPLM forbid almost all nutritional 
surveys and other common tools for evaluating the efficiency of aid programs, under the threat of 
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expelling the delinquents, as happened to the NGO Action Contre la Faim in 1997.[58] Consequently, no 
one can really protest nor stigmatize any of the warring parties for the diversion, unless it is willing to 
take the risk of being banned from the country.  
Finally, in addition to food, the technical resources brought in by aid agencies to facilitate humanitarian 
operations are also often diverted. As Pendregast contends, humanitarian infrastructures (i.e. “assets, 
agreements, and personnel that facilitate the delivery of aid”) are often “hijacked” and used by warring 
parties to pursue their military goals: communication tools (radio, walky-talkies) and the vehicles are 
often “borrowed” while the staff is “conscripted” when it has been sufficiently trained. Infrastructures 
such as roads or airstrips, rehabilitated to facilitate aid deliveries, are requisitioned by armies to move 
their military assets. Humanitarian cease-fires are even used to re-deploy and rearm, as happened during 
the 1995 “Guinea worm” cease-fire negotiated by former US President James Carter.[59] 
Therefore, as Pendregast demonstrates,[60] warring parties get enormous benefits from aid diversion. In a 
direct way, diversion of aid inputs can be seen as the “principal strategy of resource accumulation” for the 
warring parties. It feeds the soldiers; it is generally acknowledged that relief is the main, or even unique, 
source of food for the different armies in Sudan. Relief items can also be sold in order to buy arms and 
other necessary military items. Indirectly, Anderson[61] and Pendregast[62] demonstrate that 
humanitarian aid helps the rebels concentrate on war issues through what Pendregast calls the “principle 
of fungibility.” External aid substitutes itself for local public welfare responsibilities. Warring parties no 
longer have to shoulder their responsibility of ensuring food, shelter, health care and other services for 
the population. The SPLM for example has clearly developed the habit of always calling for external 
assistance to provide food and services to the population – building roads and other infrastructure, 
providing seeds, etc.[63] Warring parties can then concentrate all their energy on combat. Instead of 
spending their time and resources to get food or other logistical items, they can focus their expenses on 
getting arms and other war-related items. In rural societies such as Sudan, this also tends to transform the 
seasonal army into a more conventional one; the combatants no longer have to devote one part of the year 
to cultivating their fields and the other part to fighting. As the controversy around the 2000 Memorandum 
of Understanding in SPLM areas clearly showed, SPLM’s benefits from diversion are so substantial that 
the rebels prefer to expel the NGOs refusing to abide by their whims rather than taking a smaller share of 
humanitarian aid, no matter what this can mean for the population under their control or for their 
international image.[64].  
The US is perfectly aware of this issue, and of the benefits it represents for the warring 
parties.  
The US is perfectly aware of the problem of diversion of food aid and other aid infrastructure. Further, 
the 2000 Hearing on International Religious Freedom[65] shows in a particularly striking manner that the 
US government considers humanitarian food aid as a form of direct aid to the rebels. After Robert Seiple 
finished its statement on Sudan, a Senator asked for a clarification: “How can Robert say that the 
administration is already providing ‘direct, non-lethal aid to rebels’ and at the same time affirm that the 
administration is not working under the Brownback amendment [which authorizes the US President to 
provide food assistance to opposition groups]?” Robert Seiple’s answer was that he was referring to the 
aid offered outside the OLS system: food through an “NGO system,” “not through the opposition forces.” 
It emerges from the following discussion on the proposed Sudan Peace Act, that the current system 
(working through NGOs) is perfectly effective for what the administration wants to do.  The only trick is 
to make sure that aid reinforces the rebels, and not the government of Sudan. This means finding a way to 
counter Khartoum’s strategy of blocking access to rebel-held areas, and ensuring that humanitarian aid 
supplies do get to the rebels. 
The US strategy: countering Khartoum’s manipulation of access and ensuring that rebels have access to 
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aid  
Khartoum manipulates humanitarian access as part of its strategy of using hunger as a 
weapon  
In order to obtain the permission to operate both in governmental and in rebel areas, the UN negotiators 
had to grant Khartoum control of many aspects of OLS’s operations, including an absolute control of 
plane circulation. The OLS agreement stipulates that each month, Khartoum declares which areas will be 
open to aid deliveries. Therefore, the Government of Sudan can not only manage access to the population 
under its control, but also to the population in rebel-held areas. It has absolute control over where, when, 
and what food can be brought to any part of Sudan. The conditions for delivering aid to the rebel-held 
areas have become increasingly drastic over the years. The reason is straightforward: since 1994, the 
government of Sudan has adopted the deliberate tactic of starving the South into submission. Academic 
studies, political speeches, lobby reports and media broadcasts and articles constantly detail this strategy: 
planes bomb the agricultural infrastructure, ground troops destroy people’s ability to feed themselves (by 
slaughtering cattle, burning crops, poisoning wells, destroying everything). Khartoum works either 
directly or through the intermediary of its southern allies, paying militias to force southerners off their 
lands,[66] especially since the development of oil exploitation further increased the incentive to target 
civilians.[67] OLS agreements thus end up in an absurd situation in which aid workers are required to 
seek the permission of the government of Sudan to bring food aid to the very populations this government 
is trying to starve.  
These agreements enable Khartoum to manipulate humanitarian access as part of its strategy of using 
hunger as a weapon, as proved by the numerous flight bans to many of the places that are not under direct 
government control. As the Nuba Mountains are one of the major targets in the war, there has been a 
permanent flight ban on this area between 1994 and 1999; the government finally had to relent under 
international pressure and authorize relief to be brought to the Nuba population, but it still does so very 
sparingly. The two-months long flight ban to the rebel-held towns in the Bahr el Ghazal area in 1998 can 
also be seen as the engineering of the worst famine since 1988 by means of retaliation against places that 
had just fallen to the rebels.[68] 
Besides, denial of humanitarian access is a way of depriving the rebels of their bases, of denying them 
any opportunity for aid diversion, and of diverting aid towards places under its control. Many times, the 
government bans food aid deliveries to a rebel airstrip “for security reasons” but authorizes aid deliveries 
to the nearest airstrip under its control.[69] When people starve in areas under rebels’ control and know 
that food relief is available in garrison towns, they of course tend to move to the government places. 
There, the government often exchanges the food aid that has been delivered for religious and political 
conversions.[70] Those who prefer to resist starve to death. Diplomatic protestations and moral 
considerations do not, of course, restrain the government at all: from Khartoum’s point of view, letting 
OLS bring any food aid to populations under rebel control is doing the rebels a major favor. All 
protestations against access restrictions are seen as manifestations of ingratitude. The most cynical aspect 
of the government diversion of aid towards the places under its control is that Khartoum does not need 
food aid. In 1998, the year of the major famine in Bahr el Ghazal province, the UN reported that Sudan 
had produced a record six million five hundred thousand tons of food, which is more than enough to feed 
everyone in the country.[71] 
Finally, banning access avoids the risk of having international workers witness atrocities that the 
government prefers to hide. Opening an area to humanitarian agencies would also let the media enter 
places that the government wants to keep far from the spotlight. As the desk officer of an NGO working 
in Sudan explained, “access is the key word in such situations. If there is no access to certain areas, the 
governments that do not want to get involved can say that they don’t know. Even if there are rumors, 
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testimonies of atrocities… there is no proof.”[72] The opening of several “no-go areas” by Khartoum in 
1994 clearly demonstrates how the government plays with the aid workers and the media, showing them 
only what the government wants them to see and report on. The opening took place with considerable 
publicity and media presence. Two witnesses went beyond the border of the open zone, and there, they 
discovered “government raiders just out of view of the media” leaving behind them a “path of burned 
homes and fields and bodies.” [73] 
As a result, denial of access to OLS has often been pointed out as "the single most important constraint” 
facing aid agencies in their work.[74] Humanitarian agencies that belong to OLS and abide by the 
government’s will emphasize that limited access is better than nothing. If they were to bring relief 
without government approval, they would afterwards be denied any authorization to work in government 
places. Besides, they would lose their membership in OLS, and hence have to work illegally on Sudanese 
territory, which would mean tremendous personal risk. Consequently, in spite of all the constraints and 
moral dilemmas facing OLS members, only seventeen NGOs have chosen to refuse OLS’s agreement and 
facilities, and bring help to the population to which the government denies access without asking for 
permission. This is why, besides providing the rebels with aid through OLS, the US government 
increasingly counts on these non-OLS NGOs to pursue its strategy. 
US counter-strategy: increasing the amount of aid delivered outside the OLS framework  
The US Congress and the US administration clearly know that the Sudanese government uses 
humanitarian aid as a weapon by restricting the population’s access to it and by “manipulating the 
delivery of relief supplies to [its] advantage on the battlefield.”[75] For example, the Sudan Peace Act 
states that 
 “The Congress hereby (…) recognizes that, along with selective bans on air transport relief 
flights by the Government of Sudan, the use of raiding and slaving parties is a tool for 
creating food shortages and is used as a systematic means to destroy the societies, culture, 
and economies of the Dinka, Nuer, and Nuba peoples in a policy of low-intensity ethnic 
cleansing.”[76] 
If Khartoum’s tactic is to starve the South into submission, then to support the South means to make sure 
that it does not starve. If manipulation of aid is crucial in this war, the US has to reinforce the potential of 
aid manipulation by the SPLM and impair such potential for Khartoum. The easiest way is to encourage 
aid deliveries outside of OLS. Therefore, in almost all Congressional hearings during which the issue of 
the war in South Sudan is tackled, many Senators, Congress Representatives, and even members of the 
current administration advocate an increase of aid delivery outside of the OLS framework. 
The US funding trend for the past three years clearly reflects these recommendations. The amount given 
by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) to non-OLS NGOs has constantly 
increased since 1998[77] - i.e. since the hardening of US policies against the government of Sudan at the 
time of the bombing of the Al-Shalif factory. In 1998, funding the non-OLS NGO Norwegian People Aid 
enabled the US government to get round the government flight ban on Bahr el Ghazal province.[78] In 
fiscal year 1999, out of $159 million in humanitarian assistance to Sudan, $28.6 million went in 
emergency assistance to non-OLS NGOs ($24 million for food and $4.6 million in other non emergency 
assistance). This figure has increased in 1999 and 2000.[79] As a result, the Sudan Peace Act can proudly 
state in its Findings that “the efforts of the United States and other donors[80] in delivering relief and 
assistance through means outside OLS have played a critical role in addressing the deficiencies in OLS 
and offset the Government of Sudan’s manipulation of food donations to its advantage in the civil war in 
Sudan.”[81] The US can thus more effectively aid the rebels and, to avoid diplomatic protestations, 
pretend that it does so for “purely humanitarian” motives and  even if there is a risk of “humanitarian” aid 
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ending up in the hands of combatants, “aid can be monitored, it can be controlled, and it can be 
checked,”[82] so that it can be sure that warring parties do not benefit from it. This is not true, and 
opponents of increased assistance to southern Sudan outside of OLS have sufficiently repeated it for the 
Congress to be perfectly aware of the reality.[83] Aid channeled through humanitarian organizations does 
help the rebels considerably in their fight against Khartoum: as the CSIS has argued before the Congress, 
the US is “the principal external backer, in humanitarian and diplomatic terms, of the Southern Sudanese 
opposition”, which vitally “relies on over $100 million per annum in US humanitarian transfers.”[84] 
The question that then arises is why NGOs, so attached to their neutrality and their independence, do not 
protest against being manipulated by their donors and by the warring parties? Why do they not protest 
against this diversion of their work, which turns it into a weapon, and makes it a tool in the pursuance of 
agendas totally opposed to theirs? The answer is twofold. A minority of aid agencies understand that they 
are manipulated, but they are often prevented from taking the appropriate action. Others, the majority, do 
not realize how their actions could feed into the conflict.  
Aid agencies do not use the method that could help them avoid being manipulated  
Those who try are often prevented from taking the appropriate actions.  
To avoid the risk of being manipulated, aid providers should admit that their work is not neutral in 
essence, acknowledge the existence of the problem, analyze how and why they are manipulated, by which 
warring parties, and study how they could alleviate this problem. They should develop political and social 
analysis to better understand the situation they are working in, the dynamics of the manipulation, and 
develop potential ways to avoid their project being trapped into feeding the conflict. Information on the 
potential risk and the appropriate responses is available. Research on the interaction between 
humanitarian aid and civil wars have often taken South Sudan as a case study. Some of them have led to 
advocacy campaigns to entice aid agencies to include this type of analysis in their program evaluation.
[85] This has yielded some results so far: the major NGOs and the UN agencies working in complex 
emergencies and post-conflict situations have started to pay attention to this issue.[86] Also, for a few 
years, several European NGOs like the Médecins Sans Frontières movement have tried to better analyze 
the political and social context of their mission.[87] Most of these agencies can thus see how warring 
parties rely heavily on them for their combat missions. However, when they have reached this 
conclusion, they do not have many options.  
Almost no large-scale protest or advocacy campaign has ever been launched on this issue. First, the aid 
agencies’ claim of neutrality conflicts with the very idea of human rights and political advocacy. The 
often-neglected drawback of OLS’s claim to be neutral is that it prevents its members from speaking out 
and from denouncing the abuses of the Sudanese counterparts. Second, any protestation would jeopardize 
the agency’s access to the populations it strives to assist. It would mean high risk for the team on the 
field, and put the agency at risk of being expelled. Now, whatever the warring parties may do to the civil 
population and to the items delivered, aid agencies still want to work and try to save at least some lives. 
Therefore, as Pendregast deplores, with all emergencies in the Horn of Africa the “primacy of access” 
usually takes precedence over advocacy for justice, human rights, and international humanitarian law.[88] 
Most aid workers protest in private meetings with commanders, which usually does not really change the 
situation, but do not dare to denounce the warring parties to the international community. They also 
sometimes try to find ad-hoc solutions, on a case-by-case basis, but such small initiatives do not affect the 
overall pattern of diversion and taxation.  
The only large-scale attempt to prevent aid in Sudan from being too subjected to political manipulation, 
the Ground Rules, has been a failure. It worked on fostering a somewhat greater respect of human rights 
by the rebel movements, but it did not succeed at all in preventing rebels from manipulating aid, or in 
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convincing aid agencies that they needed political and social analysis.[89] Most NGOs still consider the 
idea of political and social analysis as totally opposed to their principle of neutrality.[90] 
Most aid agencies do not realize how their actions could feed into the conflict  
Indeed, most aid agencies still do not address the issue of their role in the prolongation of the war, in 
Sudan as everywhere else. Most aid workers still firmly believe that they can “do no harm”, that they can 
be perfectly “neutral”, that their action can yield purely positive results. Most NGOs, particularly the 
newly created or the smaller ones, still act out of a pure sense of moral outrage without paying attention 
to the potential negative side-effects of their actions. As emergency funds are disbursed for short-term 
periods, these agencies are reinforced in their tendency to function on a day-to-day basis. They have no 
incentive to try to move to some strategic thinking and consider the broader picture of their involvement 
in Sudan. They get funds to bring relief items to the affected population, so that is what they do. Even the 
large UN agencies still do not really pay attention to the issue. The 1996 Review denounced the fact that 
OLS assesses food security and health and not even the basic social and political dimensions of the crisis.
[91] As the Danish International Development Agency evaluation team still deplored three years later, 
OLS pays little attention to the “inherently political nature of vulnerability” – such as the use of food as a 
weapon, the necessity of political connections to be able to get food aid or merely to avoid being killed: 
“There are no formal mechanisms to monitor political trends in order to inform a vulnerability 
analysis.”[92] The words of  a desk officer of a disaster relief agency working in Sudan seem to represent 
many of his colleagues’ attitude: “we are aware that it can be some political weight added to Garang’s 
movement, but we are not in the business of recognizing movements. We just want to carry the work and 
help people.”[93] Without social, political, or anthropological analysis, aid agencies remain prone to all 
sorts of manipulation. Humanitarian aid remains a very efficient tool for countries interested in 
reinforcing a part of the conflict. 
It is not the purpose of this essay to explore in depth all the reasons why the aid agencies overlook their 
role in US diplomacy, as described here. If it had been so, several other factors would have had to be 
explored: the problem of immediacy of needs (when aid workers see people dying, they want to help 
them, no matter what the political implications); and the institutional interest of aid agencies (their 
fundraising campaign would have difficulty accommodating the ideas of political manipulation and aid 
feeding the war). This leads international agencies to not even question the relevance of bringing food aid 
to a fertile country that, in the 1970s, many development economists predicted would turn into the “bread 
basket of the Arab world.” On the contrary, the representation of Sudan as a land of food crisis fits into 
the Western stereotypes about Africa – African people are starving people on inhospitable land, unable to 
feed themselves but for the courageous and charitable intervention of the West (its missionaries, its 
churches, and then its governmental and non-governmental agencies). The South Sudan disaster can thus 
be normalized (a “humanitarian food crisis” and not a political one), and bringing food aid (even if to 
support the rebels) can be presented as the “normal” and logical response to such a problem.  
Conclusion 
The US appears to have adopted a very effective strategy to promote or preserve its conflicting economic, 
political, geo-strategic, and moral imperatives. The US needs to keep the Sudanese government off-
balance in order to avoid a further spread of fundamentalism and destabilization in the Horn of Africa. 
Supporting the SPLM seems the best way to maintain this situation but, for political, moral, geo-strategic 
and economic reasons, the US cannot openly do so, and it cannot afford to have the rebels seize power in 
Sudan. At that point, humanitarian aid, with its reputation of neutrality and its moral appeal concealing a 
fundamental vulnerability to all sorts of manipulation, is a very efficient tool. Food aid is especially 
useful: it directly counteracts Khartoum’s strategy (starving the South into submission) and directly helps 
the rebel movement and army in a number of ways (bringing them resources, as well as domestic and 
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international legitimacy). Food aid also has the crucial advantage of fitting perfectly into Western 
prejudices about Africa (a starving continent dependent on the West) and on humanitarian aid 
(humanitarian aid is neutral, etc). Who would then dare to question the legitimacy of the charitable US 
intervention to save starving babies? Western aid agencies’ and the media’s never questioned categories 
of analysis lead them to accept passively and reproduce the construction of the Sudanese disaster as a 
mere food problem to which relief aid is the most sensible answer. Humanitarian aid thus not only 
participates in the pursuance of US foreign policy goals in South Sudan, it is also a crucial component, 
absolutely necessary for reaching the appropriate balance. No matter if the South Sudanese populations 
are the first victims of all this. 
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